

ECON 712: TOPICS IN MACROECONOMIC THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

FALL 2018

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

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Time of Class: Thursday 6:00PM - 9:00PM

Room: PCPE 203

Office Hours: by appointment.

Course description This class will cover topics at the intersection between macroeconomics and international finance. Applications will include: endogenously incomplete markets and the optimality (or not) of government interventions, positive and normative model of government debt determination, exchange rates and theory of optimal currency areas, monetary policy and risk premia. On the methodological side, we will study how to use tools from dynamic game theory and mechanism design to analyze optimal policy when the government lacks commitment and optimal markets arrangements with lack of commitment and private information.

An important reference for the class is RMT4: Ljungqvist, Lars, and Thomas J. Sargent. Recursive macroeconomic theory. MIT press, 2018.

Expectations I will regularly assign you problem sets and there would be a take home exam at the end of the class. Some of you will be asked to present the solutions of the problem set to the class. I expect you to actively participate in class.

Topics I will tentatively cover the following topics (in particular papers with a “*”):

Optimal taxation with and without commitment

Positive and normative model of government debt determination:

- Ch. 16, RMT4. Optimal Taxation with Commitment
- Ch. 20, RMT4. Two Ramsey Problems Revisited

- Chari, and Patrick J. Kehoe. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy" in Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1999, vol. 1C, ed. John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, 1671-1745. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- *Lucas, Robert E., and Nancy L. Stokey. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital." Journal of monetary Economics 12.1 (1983): 55-93.
- *Aiyagari, S. Rao, Albert Marcet, Thomas J. Sargent, and Juha Seppälä. "Optimal taxation without state-contingent debt." Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 6 (2002): 1220-1254.
- Angeletos, George-Marios. "Fiscal policy with noncontingent debt and the optimal maturity structure." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117.3 (2002): 1105-1131.
- Buera, Francisco, and Juan Pablo Nicolini. "Optimal maturity of government debt without state contingent bonds." Journal of Monetary Economics 51.3 (2004): 531-554.
- *Werning, Ivan. "Optimal fiscal policy with redistribution." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122.3 (2007): 925-967.
- * Bhandari, Anmol, David Evans, Mikhail Golosov, and Thomas J. Sargent. Taxes, debts, and redistributions with aggregate shocks. No. w19470. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
- Bhandari, Anmol, et al. "Fiscal policy and debt management with incomplete markets." The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2016).
- Bhandari, Anmol, et al. "The Optimal Maturity of Government Debt." (2017).

Unique implementation:

- *Atkeson, Andrew, Varadarajan V. Chari, and Patrick J. Kehoe. "Sophisticated Monetary Policies." Quarterly Journal of Economics 125.1 (2010).
- Bassetto, Marco. "Equilibrium and government commitment." Journal of Economic Theory 124.1 (2005): 79-105.

Policy without commitment:

- Ch. 24. Credible Government Policies, I
- Ch. 24. Credible Government Policies, II

- *Chari, Varadarajan V., and Patrick J. Kehoe. "Sustainable plans." *Journal of political economy* 98.4 (1990): 783-802.
- *Phelan, Christopher, and Ennio Stacchetti. "Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model." *Econometrica* 69.6 (2001): 1491-1518.
- *Farhi, Emmanuel, Christopher Sleet, Ivan Werning, and Sevin Yeltekin. "Non-linear capital taxation without commitment." *Review of Economic Studies* 79, no. 4 (2012): 1469-1493.
- *Dovis, Alessandro, Mikhail Golosov, and Ali Shourideh. *Political economy of sovereign debt: A theory of cycles of populism and austerity*. No. w21948. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
- Battaglini, Marco, and Stephen Coate. "A dynamic theory of public spending, taxation, and debt." *The American Economic Review* 98.1 (2008): 201-236.

Dynamic contracts

- Ch. 21, RMT4. Insurance Versus Incentives
- Ch. 22, RMT4. Equilibrium without Commitment
- *Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Gita Gopinath. "Investment cycles and sovereign debt overhang." *The Review of economic studies* 76.1 (2009): 1-31.*
- *Dovis, Alessandro. "Efficient Sovereign Default" (2017).*
- Alvarez, Fernando, and Urban J. Jermann. "Efficiency, equilibrium, and asset pricing with risk of default." *Econometrica* 68.4 (2000): 775-797.*
- Kehoe, Timothy J., and David K. Levine. "Debt-constrained asset markets." *The Review of Economic Studies* 60.4 (1993): 865-888.*
- Atkeson, Andrew. "International lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation." *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society* (1991): 1069-1089.
- Kapicka, Marek. "Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: A first-order approach." *Review of Economic Studies* 80.3 (2013): 1027-1054.
- Gu, C., Mattesini, F., Monnet, C. and Wright, R., 2013. Endogenous credit cycles. *Journal of Political Economy*, 121(5), pp.940-965.

- Hellwig, Christian, and Guido Lorenzoni. "Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt." *Econometrica* 77.4 (2009): 1137-1164.
- Lorenzoni, Guido. "Inefficient credit booms." *The Review of Economic Studies* 75.3 (2008): 809-833.
- Thomas, Jonathan, and Tim Worrall. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem." *Journal of Economic Theory* 51.2 (1990): 367-390.
- Atkeson, Andrew, and Robert E. Lucas. "On efficient distribution with private information." *The Review of Economic Studies* 59.3 (1992): 427-453.
- Veracierto, Marcelo. "Adverse Selection, Risk Sharing and Business Cycles." (2016).
- Prescott, Edward C., and Robert M. Townsend. "Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard." *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society* (1984): 21-45.
- Kirpalani, Rishabh. "Efficiency and Policy in Models with Incomplete Markets and Borrowing Constraints." (2017).
- Atkeson, Andrew, and Harold Cole. A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation. No. w11083. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.
- Ai, Hengjie, and Anmol Bhandari. "Asset Pricing with Endogenously Uninsurable Tail Risks." Unpublished manuscript (2016).

Debt and default

- Chari, Varadarajan V., and Patrick J. Kehoe. "Sustainable plans and debt." *Journal of Economic Theory* 61.2 (1993): 230-261.
- *Aguiar, Mark, et al. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises." *Handbook of Macroeconomics* 2 (2016): 1697-1755.
- *Cole, Harold L., and Timothy J. Kehoe. "Self-fulfilling debt crises." *The Review of Economic Studies* 67.1 (2000): 91-116.
- *Aguiar, M., Amador, M., Hopenhayn, H., and Werning, I. (2016). Take the short route: Equilibrium default and debt maturity (No. w22847). National Bureau of Economic Research.

- *Bocola, Luigi, and Alessandro Dovis. Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis. No. w22694. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.
- Chari, V. V., Alessandro Dovis, and Patrick J. Kehoe. "On the optimality of financial repression." Manuscript, University of Minnesota (2018).

Bailouts

- *Chari, V. V., and Patrick J. Kehoe. "Bailouts, time inconsistency, and optimal regulation: A macroeconomic view." *The American Economic Review* 106.9 (2016): 2458-2493.
- *Farhi, Emmanuel, and Jean Tirole. "Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch, and systemic bailouts." *The American Economic Review* 102.1 (2012): 60-93.

Policy design

- *Athey, Susan, Andrew Atkeson, and Patrick J. Kehoe. "The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy." *Econometrica* 73.5 (2005): 1431-1475.
- *Piguillem, Facundo, and Anderson Schneider. *Coordination, Efficiency and Policy Discretion*. No. 1306. Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), 2016.
- *Halac, Marina, and Pierre Yared. *Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement*. No. w23919. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
- *Dovis, Alessandro, and Rishabh Kirpalani. *Fiscal rules, bailouts, and reputation in federal governments*. No. w23942. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
- *Atkeson, Andrew, Varadarajan V. Chari, and Patrick J. Kehoe. *On the optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument*. No. w13398. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
- Golosov, Mikhail, and Luigi Iovino. *Social insurance, information revelation, and lack of commitment*. No. w20633. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.

Monetary unions

- *Adao, Bernardino, Isabel Correia, and Pedro Teles. "On the relevance of exchange rate regimes for stabilization policy." *Journal of Economic Theory* 144.4 (2009): 1468-1488.

- *Farhi, Emmanuel, and Iván Werning. "A theory of macroprudential policies in the presence of nominal rigidities." *Econometrica* 84.5 (2016): 1645-1704.
- *Farhi, Emmanuel, and Ivan Werning. *Fiscal Unions*. Harvard University Open-Scholar, 2014.
- *Chari, V. V., Alessandro Dovis, and Patrick Kehoe. "Rethinking optimal currency areas." 2016.
- *Doepke, Matthias, and Martin Schneider. "Money as a Unit of Account." *Econometrica* 85.5 (2017): 1537-1574.
- Fuchs, William, and Francesco Lippi. "Monetary union with voluntary participation." *The Review of Economic Studies* 73.2 (2006): 437-457.

Monetary policy and risk premia, international monetary policy spillovers

TBD